Formal Opinions
Page 15 of 42
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In a letter dated April 16, 1998, you requested our advice on the authority of the New Haven County Sheriffs Department to operate the Union Avenue Detention Center (New Haven lockup). Your request arose as a result of a report by the Auditors of Public Accounts which questions whether your continued operation of the New Haven lockup is in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
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Your office has inquired about the status of a pending application to extend a permit previously issued to Fedus Associates, LLC to construct an asphalt plant in Colchester, Connecticut. Your inquiry asks about the effect Public Act 98-216 has on the company's application.
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This is in response to a request from your Department for an opinion on whether your agency can use minors in unannounced tobacco age law enforcement checks at Connecticut bars serving alcoholic liquor.
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You have each asked independently for our opinion on a series of questions regarding the transmission of budgetary and financial information from the Office of Policy and Management (hereinafter referred to as "OPM") to the office of the Comptroller under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 3-112 and 3-115.
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This is in reply to your September 17, 1991 letter, renewing your earlier request for an opinion on August 9, 1991. In that letter, you asked "whether the Governor may act, through executive order, to appropriate and expend state monies by authorizing the continuation of government operations."
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This is in response to your request for an opinion of the Attorney General on your authority to review an application under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-132 concerning the acquisition of The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and The Standard Fire Insurance Company by The Travelers Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as "the Travelers application") following a decision by Insurance Commissioner George M. Reider, Jr., to recuse himself.
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This is in response to your request for a formal opinion of the Attorney General, submitted in your capacity as Chairman of the Commission For Child Support Guidelines, on the following two questions: (1) Whether the child support guidelines, promulgated on January 1, 1991, are subject to the legislative review provisions of Public Act 91-209; and (2) Whether the January 1, 1991 child support guidelines, and all future guidelines, are subject to the rule-making procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.
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In your letter of June 5, 1992, you requested our opinion regarding the validity of certain legislation proposed by the Department Of Income Maintenance (DIM). That legislation would require any recipient, or any attorney representing such an individual, who initiates a legal action against a third party for recovery of medical expenses, to report the filing of that suit to the Department of Income Maintenance.
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You have requested our advice on two questions: (1) Whether under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 12-19a(a), a Payment in Lieu of Taxes (P.I.L.O.T.) grant is payable to a town for a correctional facility if such facility is not on the town's assessment list on the preceding October 1? (2) Whether Public Act No. 91-79, applies to towns that conducted revaluations prior to October 1, 1990 and currently are phasing in such revaluations?
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In your communication of December 27, 1999, you state that the Board of Trustees for the Community-Technical Colleges ("Board of Trustees") had voted earlier in 1999 to change its name and the names of each of its twelve colleges by reducing "regional community-technical college(s)" to "community college" in each title. You state that the Board of Trustees' action was based upon a "yearlong public relations study." On behalf of the Board of Governors for Higher Education ("Board of Governors") you asked whether the approval of the Board of Governors pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §10a-6 and/or of the General Assembly is required to effect legally these name changes.
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I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on the impact of the repeal of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-42, which directed the refund of liquor permit fees under certain circumstances, on pending requests for such liquor permits rebates.
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We are writing in response to your letter dated January 9, 1991, in which you request our advice about the constitutionality of the residency requirement contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10a-77(d)(2), a statute concerning tuition waives for eligible veterans.
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We are in receipt of your letter dated January 2, 1991, wherein you request our opinion on two issues concerning a gun range located on the grounds of the Enfield Community Correctional Institution. The property in question is owned by the State of Connecticut.
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This office previously responded to an inquiry concerning the authority of a Special Deputy Sheriff to serve a capias. At that time we provided an informal advice to the effect that the "better practice" was for a regular Deputy Sheriff to serve the capias, but that a Special Deputy Sheriff could assist, and suggested that it would be advisable to obtain legislative clarification with respect to what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had. During the period since that informal advice the issue of what authority a Special Deputy Sheriff had in connection with serving a capias has continued to arise. Accordingly, you have asked us to issue a formal opinion on this question. We have carefully considered the relevant legal authorities.